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Abstract
This paper investigates the long-run effects of open-market operations on the distri-
butions of assets and prices in the economy. It offers a theoretical framework to incor-
porate multiple asset holdings in a tractable heterogeneous-agent model, in which the
central bank implements policies by changing the supply of nominal bond and money.
This model features competitive search, which produces distributions of money and
bond holdings as well as price dispersion among submarkets. At a high enough bond
supply, the equilibrium shows segmentation in the asset market; only households with
good income shocks participate in the bond market. When deciding whether to par-
ticipate in the asset market, households compare liquidity services provided by money
with returns on bond. Segmentation in the asset market is generated endogenously
without assuming any rigidities or frictions in the asset market. In an equilibrium
with a segmented asset market, open-market operations affect households participa-
tion decisions and, therefore, have real effects on the distribution of assets and prices
in the economy. Numerical exercises show that the central bank can improve welfare
by purchasing bonds and supplying money when the asset market is segmented.
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1 Introduction
What are the long-run effects of open-market operations on the distribution of assets and
prices in the economy? Why do some people participate in the market for interest-bearing
assets and hold positive portfolios of these assets, while others do not participate in the asset
market and only hold money? In order to answer these questions, I construct a model of a
monetary economy with heterogeneous agents, in which the central bank implements policies
by changing the supply of nominal bonds and money. I show that a segmented asset market
arises under a specific parameters set; households with high income participate in the bond
market and hold positive portfolios of bond and money, while low income households do
not participate in the bond market and only keep money for transaction purposes. When
deciding whether to participate in the asset market, households compare liquidity services
provided by money with returns on bond. In an equilibrium with a segmented asset market,
open-market operations affect the participation decisions of the households and, therefore,
have real effects on the distribution of assets and prices in the economy.
The distribution of asset holding and segmentation in the asset market is well docu-
mented. Some agents participate in the market for interest bearing assets and hold positive
portfolios of different assets, while others do not participate in the asset market.1 Explaining
these facts requires a heterogeneous agent model in which households choose to hold differ-
ent portfolios of asset holdings. In this paper, households have different preferences towards
labor supply, and they experience different matching shocks. Heterogeneity in preferences
towards labor supply and idiosyncratic matching shocks allows me to generate an equilib-
rium distribution of asset holding among different households and a distribution of prices
among different markets.
A branch of literature uses asset market segmentation to explain persistence responses to
monetary shocks observed in the data2. In these models with segmented asset markets, only
the fraction of agents who are active in the asset markets immediately receive the monetary
shocks. As a result, it would take time for the monetary shocks to affect other agents in
the economy. This literature explains the real effects of money injection and open-market
operations using the generated segmentation in the asset market. These models use two
ways to generate the segmented asset market: limited participation models that assume
1In 2009, 7.7% of the surveyed U.S. households did not have access to banking products and services,
and at least 71% of these unbanked U.S. households earned less than $30,000 in a year. Also, 26.5% of U.S.
households did not have any savings in a bank account; moreover, they did not hold any financial assets
similar to a bank account. Source: FDIC (2009) and The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). According
to the Survey of Consumer Finances (2010), 92.5% of households had access to transaction accounts and
12% held saving bonds.
2For an overview of this literature see Edmond and Weill (2008)
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only certain agents attend the asset market and models that assume agents must pay a fixed
cost to enter the asset market or to transfer assets between the asset market and the goods
market. In a cash-in-advance framework, Grossman and Weiss (1983) assume that only a
fixed fraction of the population can withdraw funds from banks each period.3 In Alvarez
et al. (2000), agents must pay a fixed cost to transfer money between the asset market
and the goods market. In a similar fashion, Khan and Thomas (2010) assume agents pay
idiosyncratic fixed costs to transfer wealth between interest-bearing assets and money. Chiu
(2007) assumes that agents pay a fixed cost to attend the asset market, and they choose
the timing of money transfers. In a micro-founded monetary framework, Williamson (2008)
links the the asset market segmentation to the goods market segmentation.
In this paper, I generate segmentation in the asset market without assuming any rigidities
and frictions in the asset market. All of the agents can participate in the asset market every
period, and there is no transaction cost or any other frictions that prohibit agents from
trading in the asset market. Segmentation in the asset market is generated endogenously.
When deciding whether to participate in the asset market, households compare liquidity
services provided by money with return on bond. Agents hold different amounts of assets,
and some agents choose to hold no bond in their asset portfolio. In a segmented asset market,
the return on bond is not high enough to attract all of the households to the asset market.
Here, the real and welfare effects of open-market operations and money injections are not
caused by the assumed segmentation in the asset market. However, open-market operations
have real effects on the participation decisions of agents in the asset market, and as a result,
on the distributions of assets and prices when the markets are segmented. In a segmented
asset market, agents at the participation margin of trading assets may change their decision
with a marginal change in the bond supply. Numerical exercises show that the central bank
can improve welfare by purchasing bonds and supplying money. The policy of open-market
purchase of bond is most effective when the asset market is segmented. This policy would
increase the participation rate in the asset market and help households smooth consumption.
By participating in the asset market, households are able to better insure themselves against
idiosyncratic income shocks. Moreover, in a segmented asset market, open-market purchase
of bond decreases both the intensive and extensive margins of trade in the decentralized
market. The results are robust to exogenous segmentation in the asset market.
Following Wallace (1981), a branch of literature uses a Modigliani-Miller argument to
show that the size and the composition of the central bank balance sheet and thus open-
market operations do not have any real effect on the economy. In these models, assets are
perfectly substitutable in terms of liquidity services. Open-market operations do not change
3Similarly Alvarez et al. (2001), assumes only a fixed fraction of agents attend the asset market.
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the liquidity characteristics of households’ asset portfolios. Shi (2008) and Williamson (2011)
assume that assets other than money provide partial liquidity services. In these models, open-
market operations change the overall liquidity in the economy. Because of partial liquidity,
government bonds are not perfect substitutes for money and a Modigliani-Miller argument
does not hold. The same logic is applied in this paper. Agents can only trade with money,
and government bond is completely illiquid in the market for goods. Government bond is
an imperfect substitute for money, thus open-market operations can have real effects on the
economy. Here, households with good shocks use nominal bond to smooth their consumption
over time, and illiquidity of bond is important for this purpose. In a model with liquid bond,
since bond and money are perfectly substitutable, households are indifferent between holding
bond and money. They cannot use bond to smooth consumption. Kocherlakota (2003) uses
a similar argument and shows that in a centralized market, agents use illiquid bonds to
smooth consumption intertemporally.
This paper is related to the literature on the distribution of money and assets in the
economy. In a search model of monetary economy with bargaining, after each round of
trading there would be agents that have been matched and have succeeded in trade and
agents that have not traded. This would generate an evolving distribution of asset holdings
among agents, which is a state variable and makes the model intractable. Camera and
Corbae (1999) generate distribution of asset holdings among agents and price dispersion in
equilibrium in a framework based on Kiyotaki and Wright (1989).4 The evolving distribution
of asset holdings makes their model highly intractable for policy analysis. A large section of
the monetary literature avoids the distribution of asset holdings by simplifying assumptions.
Lucas (1990) and Shi (1995) assume a large household structure, and with this insurance
mechanism, agents within a household share consumption and asset holdings after each round
of trade. The sharing mechanism collapses the distribution of asset holdings to a single point.
Lagos and Wright (2005) assume a quasi-linear preference structure for the agents along with
one round of centralized trading. These assumptions make the distribution of money holdings
degenerate and the model highly tractable. By using competitive search in the decentralized
market for goods, Menzio et al. (2011) are able to make the distribution of money holdings
non-degenerate. Sun (2012) puts Menzio et al. (2011) in a Lagos-Wright framework and, by
using a household structure, the model becomes more tractable for studying the effects of
different fiscal and monetary policies. Models in Sun (2012) and Menzio et al. (2011) are
block recursive; the household’s problem can be solved without involving the endogenous
distribution of asset holdings.
4Zhu (2003), Zhu (2005) and Green and Zhou (1998) use a similar approach and have distribution of
asset holdings and price dispersion as an equilibrium object
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My paper closely follows Sun (2012) in using competitive search in the decentralized
market together with a centralized market to adjust asset balances. Households and firms
trade goods in markets with and without frictions. The frictional markets are characterized
by competitive search, where households face a trade-off between higher matching probability
and better terms of trade. Competitive search in the goods market makes the model highly
tractable.5 Households with different idiosyncratic labor cost shocks choose to hold different
amounts of assets. Search is directed in the sense that households with different portfolios
of asset holdings have different preferences towards matching probability and terms of trade
and choose different submarkets. Agents with a high income shock choose a submarket with
high price and higher matching probability. Despite a nontrivial distribution of money and
bond across agents, the competitive search in the frictional markets makes this model highly
tractable.
Unlike models with bargaining and due to the competitive nature of the frictional goods
market, the distribution of households across asset holdings does not directly affect the
firms’ cost/benefit of opening a shop in a submarket. Households’ decisions do not affect
matching probabilities and terms of trade in the frictional goods market. Households take
the specification of the submarkets as given and choose which submarket to participate in.
Households only need to know the prices in the economy, and these prices contain all of the
information about the distributions in the economy. Hence, the equilibrium is partially block
recursive.6 Households’ decisions do not directly depend on the distribution of asset holding
in the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I develop the model environ-
ment and characterize value and policy functions. Section 3 defines and characterizes the
stationary equilibrium. Section 4 presents the computational algorithm and the results of
numerical example. In Section 5, I introduce exogenously segmented asset market to the
model. Section 6 concludes the paper.
5Aside from tractability, comparing to random search, competitive search is closer to the real world.
e.g. as Howitt (2005) states:“In contrast to what happens in search models, exchanges in actual market
economies are organized by specialist traders, who mitigate search costs by providing facilities that are easy
to locate. Thus, when people wish to buy shoes they go to a shoe store; when hungry they go to a grocer;
when desiring to sell their labor services they go to firms known to offer employment. Few people would
think of planning their economic lives on the basis of random encounters with nonspecialists...”
6Unlike a block recursive equilibrium (Shi (2009), Menzio and Shi (2010) in labor, and Menzio et al.
(2011) and Sun (2012) in monetary economics), here distributions affect households’ decision through prices
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2 Model environment
Time is discrete, and each period consists of four subperiods: labor market, asset market,
frictionless market, and frictional market. The economy is populated by measure 1 of ex-
ante homogeneous households. Each household consists of a worker and a buyer. There is
a general good that can be produced and consumed by all of the households. There are
also at least three types of special goods. Each household is specialized in the production
and consumption of one of the special goods, and there is no double coincidence of wants.
Because of the specialized structure of households and the no-double-coincidence-of-wants
assumption, a medium of exchange is necessary in this environment. The utility function of
the household is
Uh(y, q, l) = U(y) + u(q)− θl
where y is the consumption of the general good, q is the consumption of the special goods,
and l is the labor supply in a period of time. The parameter θ ∈ [θ, θ] is the random
disutility of labor. It is iid across households and time, and it is drawn from the probability
distribution F (θ) at the beginning of each period. θ captures the heterogeneity of households.
U() and u() are continuous and twice differentiable. u′ > 0, U ′ > 0; u′′ < 0, U ′′ < 0;
u(0) = U(0) = u′(∞) = U ′(∞) = 0; and u′(0) and U ′(0) are large and finite. Goods are
divisible and perishable. There are two fiat objects in the economy: money and nominal
bond. Both are supplied by the central bank. Nominal bond is supplied in a centralized
market after the utility shocks have been realized. Agents redeem each unit of bond from
the last period for 1 unit of money at the beginning of each period. Bond can be costlessly
counterfeited by all households, and they cannot differentiate between the original bond that
is printed by the central bank and fake bonds that are printed by other households7. As a
result, nobody accepts bond as a medium of exchange and, households cannot trade with
bond.
Agents can trade the general good in a perfectly competitive market, called frictionless
market. There are search frictions in the market for special goods. Following Peters (1991)
and Moen (1997), I assume a competitive search environment where agents choose to search
in submarkets indexed by terms of trade and matching probability. Agents are randomly
matched, and only matched agents can trade goods. There is a measure one of competitive
firms, who hire workers from the households at the beginning of a period in a competitive
labor market. Firms pay hired workers by issuing IOUs. These IOUs can be used to trade
7Bond liquidity services have been discussed in the literature, e.g., Shi (2008), Mahmoudi (2011), and
Kocherlakota (2003).
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goods and are redeemed at the end of the period8. Households own equal shares in these
firms. Firms need labor for production of the general good and one type of special goods.
These firms are destroyed at the end of each period, and new firms are formed in the second
subperiod of each period9. I assume free entry for the firms; therefore, the number of firms
follows a zero profit condition.
In the frictional market, there exists a continuum of submarkets that have specific char-
acteristics in terms of trade and matching probabilities. Firms choose the measure of shops
to operate in each submarket. There is free entry in these submarkets. The fixed cost of
operating a shop in a submarket is k > 0 units of labor. In producing q units of special
goods, firms incur ψ(q) units of labor in production costs where, ψ() is twice continuously
differentiable and ψ′ > 0, ψ′′ > 0 and ψ(0) = 0.
Trading in these submarkets is characterized by competitive search. Each submarket is
a particular set of terms of trade (q: amount of special goods and x: money to be paid) and
matching probabilities (b: matching probability for buyers and e: matching probability for
sellers/shops). Firms and households take terms of trade and matching frictions as given and
decide which submarket to participate in. In each submarket, buyers and shops randomly
match according to the respective matching probability. Households and firms decide which
submarket to enter, therefore matching probabilities are a function of terms of trade (x, q).
Each submarket can be indexed by the respective terms of trade. I assume that matching
probability is characterized by a constant return to scale matching function (e = µ(b)), which
has the standard characteristics of a matching function10.
In the asset market, government prints money at rate γ, redeems last period nominal
bonds (A−1) for 1 unit of money, issues and sells bonds (A) for the current period at nominal
price s, and balances budget by a lump sum tax/transfers (T ). The asset market is a
competitive market, and households take bond price (s) as given.
I study the steady state equilibrium, and I will use labor as the numeraire of the model.
Figure 1 shows the timing of events.
2.1 Firms’ decision
Firms have access to a linear production technology. For each unit of labor input, they
produce one unit of output. Firms decide how much to produce in the frictionless market (Y )
and determine the measure of shops in each submarket (dN(x, q)). They sell the produced
8Because of the large structure of firms, they do not face unpredictable matching shocks and there is no
commitment problem in redeeming IOUs.
9With this assumption, there is no need to keep track of firms’ asset holdings.
10For a survey of literature on the properties of matching functions, see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
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Asset market
Government:
• transfers
• prints money
• redeems
bonds
• issues bonds
θ is realized
Asset portfolio
Labor market
Firms hire
Firms pay wage
Frictionless market
Trading in the gen-
eral good
t t+1
Frictional market
Households choose
submarkets
Firms choose
submarkets
Matching
Trading in the
special good
Figure 1: Timing
general good at the given market price P . In each submarket the matching probability for
each shop is e(x, q). Shops sell the produced special goods to matched buyers at price x. In
the production process, firms incur k units of labor in fixed cost and ψ(q) units of labor in
variable costs. Firms maximize the following profit function
pi = max
Y
{PY − Y }+
max
dN(x,q)
{
∫
{e(x, q)x− [k + e(x, q)ψ(q)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected profit of a shop
}dN(x, q) (1)
If the expected profit in a submarket is strictly positive, firms will choose dN(x, q) =∞.
If the expected profit is strictly negative, firms will choose dN(x, q) = 0. Therefore, the
optimal dN(x, q) satisfies the following inequalities with complementary slackness
e(x, q)[x− ψ(q)] ≤ k dN(x, q) ≥ 0 (2)
As is standard in the competitive search literature, I assume that the profit maximizing
condition holds for the submarkets that are not visited by any buyers and firms. For all
submarkets where k < x− ψ(q), we have
e(x, q)[x− ψ(q)] = k
dN(x, q) = 0
For the submarkets where k ≥ x − ψ(q) we have dN(x, q) = 0, and I assume e = 1 and
b = 0. I can write these two cases as
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e(x, q) =
{
k
x−ψ(q) k ≤ x− ψ(q)
1 k > x− ψ(q) (3)
Note that the matching probabilities do not depend on the distributions in the economy.
This property of the frictional market simplifies the households’ problems, and we can write
households’ matching probabilities as a function of terms of trade (x, q).
2.2 Households’ decision
2.2.1 Decision in the frictionless market
In the asset market, households redeem each unit of their nominal bonds from the previous
period for 1 unit of money. Government prints and injects money at rate γ. Government
supplies one period nominal bonds in a centralized market at the competitive price s. The
asset market closes until the next period.
Let W (m, a−1, θ) be the value function of a representative household at the beginning of
a period. The representative household holds a portfolio composed of m units of money and
a−1 units of nominal bonds in units of labor at the beginning of the period. I take labor as
the numeraire. Let w be the normalized wage rate, which is the nominal wage rate divided
by the money stock (M). The nominal wage rate associated with real balance m is wMm.
Given the prices (p, s) and transfers (T ), the household decides how much to consume in
the frictionless market (y ≥ 0), labor supply (l ≥ 0), money balances for transaction purposes
(z), money balances for precautionary saving (h), and bond holdings at the beginning of the
following period (a). Let V (z, h, a) be the value function of the representative household at
the start of the next subperiod (frictional market). The household chooses an asset portfolio
consisting of the money needed for transaction purposes (z), precautionary savings (h), and
bond holdings (a) for the frictional market. In order to purchase nominal bonds, one has to
pay the nominal price s this period to receive the nominal return 1 in the following period.
In order to have a real return a in the following period, one needs to pay sγa in terms of
labor units. The households solve the following optimization problem subject to a standard
budget constraint.
W (m, a−1, θ) = max
y,l,z,h,a
U(y)− θl + V (z, h, a)
st. py + z + h+ sγa ≤ m+ a−1 + l + T
Let us assume that V (z, h, a) is differentiable and the choice of l is an interior solution
(I will prove these later). As U() is positively sloped the budget constraint is binding. I
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use the binding budget constraint to eliminate l from the optimization problem. Using
the equilibrium condition p = 1, the value function of the representative household can be
written as
W (m, a−1, θ) = θ(m+ T + a−1) + max
y≥0
{U(y)− θpy}+ max
z,a,h
{−θ(z + sγa+ h) + V (z, h, a)}
The above expression is linear in the households’ portfolio of asset holding at the begin-
ning of the period (m, a−1). As I will show later, this linearity will simplify the problem of
the household in the decentralized market for goods. Furthermore, the households’ choice of
asset holding for the following subperiod (z, h, a) is independent of the asset holding of the
current subperiods (m, a−1).11
The optimal choices of y must satisfy
U ′(y) = θ (4)
In the above equation, I have used the equilibrium condition p = 1. Similarly z, h and a
satisfy
Vz(z, h, a)
{
≤ θ z ≥ 0
≥ θ z ≤ m− sγa− h (5)
Vh(z, h, a)
{
≤ θ h ≥ 0
≥ θ h ≤ m− sγa− z (6)
Va(z, h, a)
{
≤ θsγ a ≥ 0
≥ θsγ saγ ≤ m− z − h (7)
where the inequalities hold with complimentary slackness. m is the maximum amount
of money that households can hold in terms of labor units. Clearly, households’ money
balance (m) and bond holdings (a−1) does not affect the choices of y, z, h, and a. This is an
important property of households’ policy function. Households’ decisions are independent of
their current portfolio of asset holdings. As a result, I can write policy functions as functions
of household type (θ). Using the optimization problem of the household, I can write the
value function as a linear function of m and a−1
W (m, a−1, θ) = W (0, 0, θ) + θm+ θa−1 (8)
11The quasi-linear preference structure allows me to remove the wealth effects.
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where
W (0, 0, θ) = U(y(θ))− θy(θ) + V (z(θ), h(θ), a(θ))− θ(z(θ) + h(θ) + sγa(θ)) (9)
It is clear that the value function is continuous and differentiable. The following lemma
summarizes these findings.
Lemma 1. The value function W (m, a−1, θ) is continuous and differentiable in (m, a−1, θ).
It is also affine in m and a−1.
Lemma 1 shows the standard linearity property that is shared by frameworks based on
Lagos and Wright (2005). I can use this property to simplify households’ decision in the
frictional market.
2.2.2 Decision in the frictional market
The representative household’s decision in the frictional market is similar to Sun (2012).
The representative household chooses which submarket to participate in. As I can index the
submarkets by the respective terms of trade, the household chooses the terms of trade (x
and q) to maximize the expected value of attending the respective submarket. In choosing
which submarket to participate in, households are constrained by their amount of money
holding (x ≤ z).12 In a submarket, the household matches with probability b(x, q) and
trades according to the stated terms of trade. The matching probability comes from the
firms’ decision problems. In each match, the representative household spends x amount of
money and consumes q amount of special good. With probability 1−b(x, q) there is no match
and the representative household exits the frictional market with the starting portfolio of
assets. As is standard in the search and matching literature, I assume b(x, q) is nonincreasing.
The representative household solves the following optimization problem
v(z, h, a) =
max
x≤z,q
b(x, q)
[
u(q) + βE[W (
z − x+ h
γ
, a, θ)]
]
+
[1− b(x, q)]βE
[
W (
z + h
γ
, a, θ)
]
(10)
Using the linearity of W (.) (8) and firms’ optimization problem (3), I can eliminate q
from the above expression. The household’s problem becomes
12Because households are committed to posted terms of trade they cannot choose a submarket in which
they cannot afford to trade.
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v(z, h, a) =
max
x≤z,b
{
b
[
u(ψ−1(x− k
µ(b)
))− βE(θ)x
γ
]
+ βE
[
W (
z + h
γ
, a, θ)
]}
(11)
The optimal choices of x and b satisfy the following first-order conditions
u′
(
ψ−1(x− k
µ(b)
)
)
ψ′
(
ψ−1(x− k
µ(b)
)
) − βE(θ)
γ
≥ 0, x ≤ z (12)
u
(
ψ−1(x− k
µ(b)
)
)
− βE(θ)x
γ
+
u′
(
ψ−1(x− k
µ(b)
)
)
ψ′
(
ψ−1(x− k
µ(b)
)
) kbµ′(b)
[µ(b)]2
≤ 0, b ≥ 0 (13)
where the two sets of inequalities hold with complementary slackness. Note that b = 1
cannot be an equilibrium outcome13.
For b(z) = 0, I assume x(z) = z. Define Φ(q) = u
′(q)
ψ′(q) . As is shown in Sun (2012), without
loss of generality, I can focus on the case x(z) = z. Similar to Sun (2012), households do not
need to hold more money than they want to spend. If the following condition holds 14
u
(
φ−1
[
βE(θ)
γ
])
− βE(θ)
γ
(
ψ
(
φ−1
[
βE(θ)
γ
])
+ k
)
> 0 (14)
the household’s problem becomes
B(z) + βE
[
W (
z + h
γ
, a, θ)
]
(15)
13b = 1 implies e = 0, dN(z, q) = ∞, and positive profits for the firms. This violates free firms’ entry
condition.
14Let us assume for b(z) > 0, x(z) < z. Then 11 is independent of z. 13 holds with equality and can be
written as:
q∗ = Φ−1[
βE(θ)
γ
]
Given q∗, 13 can be written as:
u(q∗)− βE(θ)
γ
[
ψ(q∗) +
k
µb∗
]
+
[
u′(q∗)
ψ′(q∗)
]
kb∗µ′(b∗)
[µ(b∗)]2
= 0
The left-hand side of the above equation is strictly increasing in b∗, and b∗ exists and is unique if E(θ)γ
satisfies:
u(q∗)− βE(θ)
γ
[ψ(q∗) + k] > 0
For all z < x∗ = ψ(q∗) + kµ(b∗) , x(z) = z. For z ≥ x∗, x(z) = x∗.
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where
B(z) = max
b∈[0,1]
b
[
u(ψ−1(z − k
µ(b)
))− β z
γ
E(θ)
]
(16)
The value functionB(z) may not be concave in z. Furthermore, equation 16 is the product
of the choice variable b, and a function of b and this product may not be concave. Following
Menzio et al. (2011) and Sun (2012), I introduce lotteries to make the households’ value
function concave15. A lottery is a choice of probabilities (pi1, pi2) and respective payments
(L1, L2) that solves the following problem
V˜ (z) = max
L1,L2,pi1,pi2
[pi1B(L1) + pi2B(L2)] (17)
subject to
pi1L1 + pi2L2 = z; L2 ≥ L1 ≥ 0
pi1 + pi2 = 1; pii ∈ [0, 1]
Note that the agent’s policy functions for the lottery choices are: Li∈{1,2}(z) and pii∈{1,2}(z).
V˜ (z) is the household’s value function after playing the lottery. After playing this lottery,
the value function of the household becomes concave.
2.3 Government
Government imposes policies by either changing the inflation rate (γ) or changing the
relative supply of bond (λ). I assume that the government runs a balanced budget at each
period. Let us define
λ =
A−1
M
as the ratio of stock of bond to stock of money in the economy. λ shows the composition of
the central bank’s balance sheet. A temporary jump in λ indicates that the central bank has
issued more short-term debt and the composition of its balance sheet has shifted to short-
term financing of the government transfers. The total real transfer that a household receives
(T ) is the sum of transfers from printing money (seigniorage) and the transfers received from
the bond market.16
15The numerical exercise in Section 4 shows that households play lotteries only when they have very low
real balances and this does not happen in equilibrium.
16Note that because of the quasi-linear structure of households’ utility function, government transfers can
be interpreted as a public good.
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T =
γ − 1
wγ
+
sA− A−1
wM ′
(18)
2.4 Properties of value and policy functions
Here, I characterize policy functions and value functions. As shown in the previous
section, the choice of bond holdings and bond prices does not directly affect households’
decisions in the frictional market. The solution to firms’ problem (3) shows that the matching
probabilities do not depend on the distributions in the economy. Sun (2012) discusses fiscal
policy in a framework similar to the one used here. In that environment, fiscal policy
variables do not directly affect households’ decisions in the frictional market. As a result,
the properties of value functions and the households’ choice of which submarket to search
(x, q) are the same as in Sun (2012). Let us define ẑ as the maximum value of real balance
(z) that equation 14 holds. The following lemma shows the properties of the value functions
and policy functions:
Lemma 2. The following statements about the value functions and policy functions are true
1. The value function B(z) is continuous and increasing in z ∈ [0, ẑ].
2. The value function V˜ (z) is continuous, differentiable, increasing, and concave in z ∈
[0, ẑ].
3. For z such that b(z) = 0, the value function B(z) = 0 and the choice of q is irrelevant.
4. If and only if there exists a q > 0 that satisfies
u(q)− βE(θ)
γ
[ψ(q) + k] > 0
there exists a z > 0 such that b(z) > 0.
5. For z such that b(z) > 0, the value function B(z) is differentiable, B(z) > 0, and
B′(z) > 0.
6. b(z) and q(z) are unique and
b′(z) > 0
q′(z) > 0
7. b(z) solves
max
b∈[0,1]
{
u (q(z))− βE(θ)z
γ
+
u′ (q(z))
ψ′ (q(z))
kbµ′(b)
[µ(b)]2
}
(19)
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where
q(z) = ψ−1
(
z − k
µ(b(z))
)
(20)
8. b(z) strictly decreases with E(θ), and q(z) strictly increases in E(θ).
9. There exists z1 > k such that b(z) = 0 for all z ∈ [0, z1] and b(z) > 0 for all z ∈ (z1, ẑ].
10. There exists z0 > z1 such that a household with z < z0 will play the lottery with the
prize z0.
Since the choices of bond holdings and bond prices do not directly affect households’
decisions in the frictional market, the proof of lemma 2 is exactly similar to lemma 2 in
Sun (2012). Lemma 2 summarizes the characteristics of the value functions. According to
part 6, households with higher money balances choose to trade in submarkets with higher
matching probabilities and higher terms of trade. They sort themselves in different submar-
kets according to their money holdings. A household with a higher money balance has lower
marginal value for money. This household wants to get rid of a high amount of money in a
short period of time and therefore chooses a submarket with high price and high matching
probability.
Equations 8, 10, 16, and 17 give
V (z, h, a) = V˜ (z) + βE
[
W (
z + h
γ
, a, θ)
]
= V˜ (z) + βE [W (0, 0, θ)] +
βE(θ)z
γ
+
βE(θ)h
γ
+ βE(θ)a (21)
Equation 21 shows that V (z, h, a) is linear in a and h, and the slopes are
Va(z, h, a) = βE(θ) (22)
Vh(z, h, a) =
βE(θ)
γ
(23)
Using lemma 2, equations 22, and 23 and policy functions 26 and 25, I can conclude the
following lemma.
Lemma 3. The value function V is continuous and differentiable in (z, h, a). V (z, h, a) is
increasing and concave in z ∈ [0, ẑ]. V (z, h, a) ≥ βE[W (0, 0, θ)] > 0 for all z.
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Continuity and differentiability of V with respect to precautionary savings (h) and bond
holdings (a) is trivially concluded from the linearity condition (21, 22, 23). V is increasing
and concave in z ∈ [0, ẑ], because equation 21 can be differentiated as
∂V (z, h, a)
∂z
=
dV˜ (z)
dz
+
βE(θ)
γ
(24)
and lemma 2 shows that V˜ (z) is increasing and concave in z.
Using conditions 6, 7, 22, and 23, I can write the households’ choice of bond holdings
and precautionary savings in money as follows{
h(θ) ≥ 0 θ ≥ βE(θ)
γ
h(θ) ≤ m− z(θ)− sγa(θ) θ ≤ βE(θ)
γ
(25)
{
a(θ) ≥ 0 θ ≥ βE(θ)
sγ
sγa(θ) ≤ m− z(θ)− h(θ) θ ≤ βE(θ)
sγ
(26)
where the inequalities hold with complementary slackness. Using equations 21, 26, 25,
and 24, I can characterize the policy functions of the households with respect to asset holdings
and labor supply in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. a(θ), h(θ), z(θ), and l(m, a−1, θ) follow the following rules:
Case I: Negative nominal interest rate (s ≥ 1)
θ < βE(θ)
γ

h(θ) = m− z(θ)
a(θ) = 0
l(m, a−1, θ) = py(θ) +m− a−1 − T
Vz = V˜z(z)
θ ≥ βE(θ)
γ

h(θ) = 0
a(θ) = 0
l(m, a−1, θ) = py(θ)−m− a−1 − T
Vz = V˜z(z) +
βE(θ)
γ
(27)
Case II: Positive nominal interest rate (s < 1)
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
θ < βE(θ)
sγ

h(θ) = 0
a(θ) = m−z(θ)
sγ
l(m, a−1, θ) = py(θ) + z(θ)(1− sγ) + sγm− a−1 − T
Vz = V˜z(z) + βE(θ)(
1
γ
− 1)
θ ≥ βE(θ)
sγ

h(θ) = 0
a(θ) = 0
l(m, a−1, θ) = py(θ) + z(θ)−m− a−1 − T
Vz = V˜z(z) +
βE(θ)
γ
(28)
Lemma 4 and equation 5 show the characteristics of the policy functions in two cases:
when nominal interest rate is negative (27) and when it is positive (28). In an equilibrium
with a negative nominal interest rate, households choose to hold all of their portfolio in terms
of money. Money has a greater return compared to bonds in this case and households decide
to hold all of their precautionary savings in terms of money. Higher amount of portfolio from
the previous period (m, a−1) reduces the labor supply (l(m, a−1, θ)), and households choose
to work less because of the higher value of their asset portfolio.
Lemma 4 shows that the equilibrium is partially block recursive. Households do not need
to know the distribution of the asset holding for their decision problems, and prices (p, s, and
w) contain all the information they need about the distributions in the aggregate economy.
In the next section, I show that we cannot have a negative nominal interest rate in the
stationary equilibrium and households’ policy functions can be described by 28.
3 Stationary Equilibrium
Here, I characterize the stationary equilibrium.
Definition 1. A stationary equilibrium is the set of household value functions (W,B, V, V˜ );
household choices (y, l, z, a, h, q, b, L1, L2, pi1, pi2); firm choices (Y, dN(q, b)); and prices (p, s, w)
that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Given the prices (p, s, w), realization of shocks (θ), asset balances, and terms of trade
in all submarkets (q, x), household choices solve households’ optimality conditions (28
and 27)
2. Given prices and the terms of trade in all submarkets, firms maximize profit (1)
3. Free entry condition (3)
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4. Stationarity
5. Symmetry
6. Bond market clears (29), labor market clears (30), and general goods market clears
(p = 1)
In the bond market, the total amount of bonds supplied equals the sum of demanded
bonds by households of different type. The nominal amount of supplied bonds by the central
bank is As, and therefore the real supply of bonds is As
wM
. The market clearing for bonds
gives
As
wM
=
∫ ∫ ∫ θ
θ
a dF (θ)dG(m)dH(a−1) =
∫ θ
θ
a(θ)dF (θ) (29)
where in the second equality, I use the fact that households’ decisions on their asset holdings
is only based on their labor supply shock.
Lemma 5. No positive bond supply (λ > 0) can support an equilibrium with negative nominal
interest rate (s ≥ 1). Households choose to hold bonds as precautionary saving, and they
only choose money for transaction purposes:
• h(θ) = 0
• z(θ) ≥ 0
From condition 27 and bond market clearing condition 29, it is straightforward to show
that positive amounts of bond supply would not clear the market when s ≥ 1. With a
positive real interest rate, households never use money for precautionary motives.
There are two cases for the equilibrium: First, when θ < βE(θ)
sγ
< θ, households with
low enough θ choose to hold a positive amount of bond (traders in the asset market), while
households with high θ only hold money for transaction purposes (non-traders in the asset
market). Figure 2 shows that the threshold βE(θ)
sγ
determines who participates in the asset
market.
Second, in the case where θ < βE(θ)
sγ
all of the households hold a portfolio of bonds and
money17. In figure 3, βE(θ)
sγ
is very high and everyone participates in the market for bond.
In deciding whether to participate in the asset market, households compare two scenarios:
1-working this period and buying bonds and redeeming purchased bonds for money next
period, and 2-not working this period and working next period.
17Note that with positive bond supply, we cannot have the case in which βE(θ)sγ < θ.
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θθ
βE(θ)
sγ
Traders Non-traders
Figure 2: Segmented asset market
θθ
βE(θ)
sγ
Traders
Figure 3: Asset market with no segmentation
From lemma 5 and equations 28, 17, and 5, I can show that changes in bond supply (λ)
would change the threshold (βE(θ)
sγ
). Figure 2 shows that an equilibrium with a segmented
asset market arises when θ < βE(θ)
sγ
< θ. In an equilibrium with a segmented asset market,
open-market operations affect the decision of the households regarding the composition of
their real portfolio of assets for households at the participation margin and therefore have
real effects on the distributions of asset portfolios in the economy.
Lemma 4 shows that when we have an equilibrium with no segmentation in the asset
market, money holding from the previous period does not affect agents’ labor supply. In
the same type of equilibrium, households’ bond holding has a negative effect on their labor
supply. This property of the equilibrium is due to the fact that households in an asset
market with no segmentation and households with good shocks in a segmented asset market
(θ < βE(θ)
sγ
) hold money balances only for transaction purposes. Note that this is different
from the pure precautionary motive (h(θ) > 0), and bonds always dominate money because
of positive real interest rate (s < 1). In a segmented asset market, households with bad
labor supply shocks (θ ≥ βE(θ)
sγ
) consider unmatched buyers’ expected money balances as a
precautionary motive for saving.
As shown in appendix A, the labor market clearing condition is
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1wγ
[γ − 1 + λ(s− 1)] =
(2− sγ)
∫ θ
θ
a(θ)dF (θ) + (1− 1
γ
)
∫ θ
θ
pi1(z(θ))(1− b(L1(z(θ))))L1(z(θ))dF (θ)
+(1− 1
γ
)
∫ θ
θ
pi2(z(θ))(1− b(L2(z(θ))))L2(z(θ))dF (θ)− 1
γ
∫ θ
θ
h(θ)dF (θ) (30)
Using lemmas 4 and 5, market clearing condition for the asset market and the fact
that households do not save money for precautionary motives, I can summarize the market
clearing conditions to a single equation that could be solved for bond price (s)
[
1
γ2s
+ (1− γ − λ(s− 1)(2− sγ))]
∫ βE(θ)
sγ
θ
a(θ)dF (θ) =
γ(1− γ)
∫ θ
θ
pi1(z(θ))(1− b(L1(z(θ))))L1(z(θ))dF (θ)
+γ(1− γ)
∫ θ
θ
pi2(z(θ))(1− b(L2(z(θ))))L2(z(θ))dF (θ) (31)
For γ < 2, the left-hand side of the above expression does not increase with bond price
(s). Note that equation 31 cannot solely be used for numerical computations, and we need
to compute wage (30) and check for positive wages. From equations 28, 29, and 31, I can
characterize the set of prices in equilibrium. Let us define s and s as
s =
βE(θ)
θγ
s =
βE(θ)
θγ
Let bond price be in the range: s ≤ s. The left-hand side of 31 is 0, while the right-hand
side is a positive number. In this case, there is no equilibrium. Previously, I have shown that
s < 1 in equilibrium. Therefore, the market clears at a price in the range s < min{1, s}.
Let us define ζ(γ, λ) as
ζ(γ, λ) =
∑
i=1,2
∫ θ
θ
pii(z(θ))(1− b(Li(z(θ))))Li(z(θ))dF (θ) (32)
For the case where s < s, figure 3 shows the policy functions. In this case, ζ(γ, λ) is
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independent of λ, and I show it by ζ1(γ). The only policy variable on the right-hand side of
31 is γ. For a constant positive rate of inflation (γ > 1), the left-hand side shows a positive
relationship between bond price and bond supply18. From figures 2 and 3 and the positive
relationship between bond price and bond supply, I can summarize the demand for bond in
figure 4.
Bond demand
Bond price (s)
s
min{s, 1}
No equilibrium
Figure 4: Demand for bond (γ > 1)
For low bond price, the return on bond is high enough to attract all of the households to
the asset market. They hold a positive portfolio of money and bond according to figure 2.
With higher bond price (lower interest rate), we have a segmented asset market, and higher
price in this type of equilibrium leads to low asset market participation.
From 31 and 32 proposition 1 follows
Proposition 1. Let us define s˜ = min(1, s). Then for a positive rate of inflation (γ > 1),
there exists the following thresholds: smin and λu, which solves the following equations
[
1
γ2s˜
+ (1− γ − λ(s˜− 1)(2− s˜γ))]
∫ βE(θ)
s˜γ
θ
a(θ)dF (θ) = γ(1− γ)ζ(γ, λu) (33)
18We can rewrite the expression on the left hand side of 31 as
[
1
γ2s
+ (2− sγ)(1− γ) + λ(s− 1)(sγ − 2)]
∫ βE(θ)
sγ
θ
a(θ)dF (θ)
The above expression shows a positive relationship between bond price (s) and bond supply (λ) for positive
real interest rates (s < 1) and positive inflation rate (γ > 1).
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[
1
γ2smin
+ 1− γ]
∫ βE(θ)
sminγ
θ
a(θ)dF (θ) = γ(1− γ)ζ(γ, 0) (34)
where
1. Bond price is in the range: smin < s < s˜
2. Bond supply is in the range: 0 < λ < λu
In the above proposition, I have used the positive relationship between bond price (s)
and bond supply (λ) from equation 31 to derive the equilibrium limits for bond price and
bond supply.
3.1 Welfare analysis
I have shown in the appendix C that the steady state welfare can be calculated using the
following expression
$ =
∫
[U(y(θ))− θy(θ) + u(q(z(θ)))− θz(θ)− θh(θ)− sγθa(θ)]dF (θ)
+
[∫ θ
θ
pi1(z(θ))[1− b(L1(z(θ)))]L1(z(θ))
γ
dF (θ)
]∫
θdF (θ)
+
[∫ θ
θ
pi2(z(θ))[1− b(L2(z(θ)))]L2(z(θ))
γ
dF (θ)
]∫
θdF (θ)
+(1 +
1
γ
)
[∫
a−1dHa−1
] ∫
θdF (θ) +
1
γ
[∫
h−1dJh−1
] ∫
θdF (θ)
+
1
wγ
[γ − 1− λ+ sλ]
∫
θdF (θ)
Using lemma 5 and equations 30 and 32 the measure of welfare can be simplified as
$ =
∫
[U(y(θ))− θy(θ)]dF (θ) +
∫
[u(q(z(θ)))− θz(θ)− sγθa(θ)]dF (θ)
+
[
ζ(γ, λ) + (2− s+ 1 + 1
γ
)
∫
a(θ)dF (θ)
] ∫
θdF (θ) (35)
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4 Numerical Example
In order to simulate the economy, I use the partial block recursivity of the equilibrium.
I use the following algorithm:
1. For given supply of bonds (λ) and inflation (γ), and an arbitrary bond price (s) calcu-
late policy functions (a(θ), h(θ), z(θ), y(θ), l(θ), b(z(θ)), q(z(θ))) (4) and lottery choices
(pi1(z(θ)), pi2(z(θ)), L1(z(θ)), L2(z(θ))) (17)
2. Calculate the value functions (B(z(θ)), V˜ (z(θ)))
3. Calculate wage (w) using labor market clearing condition 30
4. If w < 0 change s and start from 1.
5. Check bond market clearing condition 29, adjust bond price and start from 1. until
bond market clears.
I simulate the economy using the following functional forms:
u(c) = u0
(c+ a)1−σ − a1−σ
1− σ ;U(c) = U0
(c+ a)1−σu − a1−σu
1− σu
ψ(q) = ψ0q
ψ;µ(b) = 1− b;F (θ) is continuous uniform on [θ, θ]
I use the following parameter values:
β = 0.96 u0 = 1 U0 = 100 a = 0.01
σ = 2 σu = 2 φ = 2 ψ0 = 1
k = 1 m = 20 θ ∈ [0.25, 1.75] F (θ) uniform
Figure 5 shows the policy functions regarding households’ portfolio and the effects of
open-market operations. In a segmented asset market, high income households choose a
positive portfolio of bond and money. The threshold that determines who participates in
the asset market is affected by open-market operations. As it can be seen in figure 5 an
open-market purchase of bond would increase the real interest rate and shift the threshold
to the right. More households decide to participate in the bond market as a result of an
open-market purchase of assets.
Figure 6 shows the asset portfolio choice of households in an equilibrium with no seg-
mentation. Comparing to figure 5, here bond supply is so low that high real interest rates
attract all of the households to the asset market and they hold a positive portfolio composing
of money and bond. A marginal policy of pure open-market operation would not affect the
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Figure 5: Choice of asset holding in a segmented asset market
Figure 6: Choice of asset holding in an equilibrium with no segmentation
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decision of households regarding their real asset holding, and would not have real effects on
the distributions in the economy.
Figure 7 shows labor supply in an equilibrium with no segmentation in the asset market.
Households with bad shocks (high θ) and high asset balance work less. Households with good
shocks (low θ) work more and hold more money for transaction purposes. A pure policy of
open-market operations (marginal change in λ) would shift the labor supply. Higher real
interest rate would change labor supply of households but households’ real asset holding
would not change (Figure 6).
Figure 7: Labor supply in an equilibrium with no segmentation (γ = 1.01, λ = 0.003)
Figure 8 shows labor supply in an equilibrium with segmented asset market. Households
with bad shocks (θ ≥ βE(θ)
sγ
) supply labor only to fund their money holding for the next
subperiod (z(θ)). Households who received better shocks than the threshold for asset market
participation (θ < βE(θ)
sγ
) provide high labor supply to buy bonds (a(θ)) as a precautionary
saving for the next period. A pure policy of open-market operations (marginal changes in λ)
has two effects: First, it has a level effect on the labor supply. This is similar to the case with
no segmentation. Higher real interest rates requires higher labor supply for the same real
asset holding. Second, open-market operations changes the threshold (βE(θ)
sγ
), and therefore
affects the participation decision of households in the market for bonds. Higher real interest
rate, attracts some of households who were not participating in the asset market, and these
households supply more labor.
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Figure 8: Labor supply in an equilibrium with segmented asset market (γ = 1.01, λ = 0.0085)
Figure 9 shows the characteristics of submarkets in the decentralized market. Agents
with higher money holdings search in submarkets with higher price, output and matching
probabilities. This property of the equilibrium is shared with many competitive search
models19. Agents sort themselves according to their money holdings. Households with
higher money balances have low marginal value for money. As shown in lemma 2, they
decide to get rid of a high amount of money as soon as they can and choose submarket
with higher price and higher matching probability compared to households with low money
balances. Unlike models of bargaining, buyers and sellers know the marginal value of money
holdings of all of the households in the economy and they commit to posted terms of trade.
Figures 10 shows the output choice of households in the decentralized market. Generally,
households with better shocks participate in submarkets with higher output. As shown
in figures 5 and 6, conditional on participation(/not participation) in the asset market,
households with better shocks choose higher amounts of money balances. Figure 9 shows
that households with higher money balances choose higher output. Therefore, we can see
that conditional on participating (/not participating) in the asset market households with
better shocks choose submarkets with higher output and figure 10 confirms this. In the case
with a segmented asset market (figure on the right) a marginal open-market purchase of
bond would increase asset market participation and reduce real output choice of households
19e.g. equilibrium in Menzio et al. (2011) and Sun (2012) shows similar properties.
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Figure 9: Policy function in decentralized market
on the participation margin to lower values.
Figure 10: Output choice of households in decentralized market
Figure 11 shows the matching probability choice of households in he decentralized market.
As shown in figures 5 and 6, conditional on participation(/not participation) in the asset
market, households with better shocks choose higher amounts of money balances. Figure 9
shows that households with higher money balances choose submarkets with higher matching
probabilities. As a result, conditional on participating (/not participating) in the asset
market households with better shocks choose submarkets with higher matching probability
and figure 11 confirms this. In the case with a segmented asset market (figure on the right)
a marginal open-market purchase of bond would increase asset market participation and
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reduce real output choice of households on the participation margin to lower values.
Figure 11: Matching probability choice of households in decentralized market
I can discuss the effects of open-market operations on the extensive and intensive mar-
gins using figures 10 and 11. A marginal open-market purchase of bond would decrease λ
and bond price (s). This policy will have no effects on the intensive margin (right graph
in 10) and extensive margin (right graph in 11) when we have an asset market with no
segmentation. As shown in figures 10 and 11 In a segmented asset market, open market
purchase of bonds would shift the threshold for asset market participation to the right. This
will decrease both the intensive and the extensive margins of trade for households in the
participation margin. Higher real interest rate attracts a subset of households to the bond
market. In the decentralized market these households choose to apply to submarkets with
lower matching probability and lower output and this will decrease both the extensive margin
and the intensive margin of trade.
Figure 12 shows that conditional on participating (/not participating) in the asset market,
household with better income shock pay lower price per unit of output in the decentralized
market.
Figures 13 shows welfare for different values of bond supply and inflation rate. The
central bank can generally affect overal welfare by purchasing bonds and supplying money.
The policy of open-market purchase of bond is most effective when the asset market is
segmented. This policy would increase the participation rate in the asset market and help
households smooth consumption. By participating in the asset market, households are able
to better insure themselves against idiosyncratic income shocks. When the asset market
is not segmented, marginal open-market purchase/sale of bond would only change the real
interest rate.
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Figure 12: Price per unit choice of households in decentralized market
Figure 13: Welfare
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Figure 14 shows equilibrium bond price (s) for different amounts of bond supply (λ) and
different inflation rates (γ). At each level of inflation bond price increases with higher supply
of bonds20.
Figure 14: Bond prices
Figure 15 shows equilibrium wage (w) for different amounts of bond supply (λ). For a
fixed rate of inflation, wage increases with bond supply.
20Note that the price of bond is the inverse of nominal return on bonds
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Figure 15: Wage
5 Exogenously segmented asset market
In this section I introduce another source of heterogeneity to the model. Following Alvarez
et al. (2001), I assume only a fixed fraction of households attend the asset markets (traders),
and the remaining never has access to the asset market (non-traders). This extension allows
me to compare the results of this paper to the literature that assumes the asset markets
are exogenously segmented21. Theorem 2 shows that the same logic from the case with
endogenous asset market segmentation applies and asset market traders and non-traders
solve optimization problems similar to the problem in the previous sections. The households’
decisions are only linked through the market clearing conditions and prices. Households do
not take in to account the distribution of asset holdings among traders and non-traders. The
following theorem shows that the main results in the previous sections are robust to adding
exogenously segmented asset market.
Theorem 2. With exogenously segmented asset markets, value functions, policy functions
and labor choices of traders in the asset market have the same properties as the case without
exogenously segmented asset market.
The formal proof is in the appendix D.
21e.g. Alvarez et al. (2001), Khan and Thomas (2010) and Chiu (2007)
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6 Concluding Remarks and Possible Extensions
This paper studies the central bank’s open-market operations in a model with heteroge-
neous agents. Using competitive search in the frictional market for goods allows me to study
the distribution of asset holding in a tractable model. The central bank can implement mon-
etary policy by supplying money and trading bonds in the asset market. There are two types
of equilibria. In an equilibrium with low bond supply, the asset market is not segmented.
All of the agents participate in the asset market and hold positive portfolios of bonds and
money. In an equilibrium with high bond supply, segmentation is generated endogenously.
Households with high labor supply shocks participate in the asset market and hold positive
portfolios of bonds and money. Households with low labor supply shock only hold money in
their portfolios.
In an equilibrium with no segmentation, open-market operations have no real effects on
the distribution of real asset holding. In an equilibrium with segmented asset market, open-
market operations change the decision of a subset of households and have real effects on the
distribution of asset holdings. The main results are robust to exogenously segmented asset
market.
One possible extension of the model is to relax the quasi-linear preference of the house-
holds to a more general preference structure. With a more general preference structure, one
can study the wealth effects in this framework. In this setup, it would be difficult to analyt-
ically show some of the properties of the equilibrium and computational exercise would be
more critical. By adding aggregate shocks to the economy, one can do an analysis similar to
Krusell and Smith (1998) with this framework.
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Appendix
A Market clearing conditions
I can find the cumulative distribution of money before lotteries by:
G(m) =
∫ ∫ θ
z−1(m)
dF (θ)dH (36)
and similarly the distribution of bond before lotteries follows:
H(a−1) =
∫ ∫ θ
a−1(a−1)
dF (θ)dG (37)
I assume a balanced budget for government at each period of time. The total real transfer
that a household receives is the sum of transfers from printing money and the transfers
received from bond market:
T =
γ − 1
wγ
+
sA− A−1
wM ′
(38)
In the bond market the total amount of bonds supplied equals the sum of demanded
bonds by households of different type. Thus, the market clearing for bonds gives:
As
wM
=
∫ ∫ ∫ θ
θ
a(θ)dF (θ)dG(m)dH(a−1) (39)
In the general-good market, the market clearing condition is:
Y =
∫ θ
θ
y(θ)dF (θ) (40)
LD is the same as Sun (2012):
LD = Y +
∫ θ
θ
pi1(z(θ))b(L1(z(θ)))
µ(b(L1(z(θ))))
[k + ψ(q(L1(z(θ))))µ(b(L1(z(θ))))] dF (θ)
+
∫ θ
θ
pi2(z(θ))b(L2(z(θ)))
µ(b(L2(z(θ))))
[k + ψ(q(L2(z(θ))))µ(b(L2(z(θ))))] dF (θ) (41)
The firms zero-profit condition gives:
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k + ψ (q(Li(z(θ))))µ(b(Li(z(θ)))) = Li(z(θ))
Then LD becomes:
LD =
∫ θ
θ
y(θ)dF (θ) +
∫ θ
θ
pi1(z(θ))b (L1(z(θ)))L1(z(θ))dF (θ)
+
∫ θ
θ
pi2(z(θ))b (L2(z(θ)))L2(z(θ))dF (θ) (42)
Aggregate labor supply is the sum of households labor supply:
LS =
∫ θ
θ
∫ ∫
l(m, a, θ)dF (θ)dGa(m)dH(a−1)
in which dGm is the distribution of money holdings at the beginning of the period. Substi-
tuting for l in the above equation we get
LS =
∫ θ
θ
∫ ∫
[py(θ) + z(θ) + sγa(θ)−m− a−1 − T ] dF (θ)dGa(m)dH(a−1) (43)
Substituting for T :
LS =
∫ θ
θ
∫ ∫
[py(θ) + z(θ) + sγa(θ)−m− a−1 − γ − 1
wγ
− sA
wM ′
+
A−1
wγM
]dF (θ)dGa(m)dH(a−1) (44)
LS becomes:
LS =
A−1
wγM
− sA
wM ′
− γ − 1
wγ
−
∫
mdGa(m)−
∫
a−1dH(a−1)
+
∫ θ
θ
[y(θ) + z(θ) + sγa(θ)]dF (θ) (45)
Labor market clearing condition gives:
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∫ θ
θ
sγa(θ)dF (θ) +
∫ θ
θ
pi1(z(θ))(1− b(L1(z(θ))))L1(z(θ))dF (θ)
+
∫ θ
θ
pi2(z(θ))(1− b(L2(z(θ))))L2(z(θ))dF (θ)
=
sA
wM ′
+
γ − 1
wγ
− A−1
wγM
+
∫
mdGa(m) +
∫
a−1dH(a−1)
m is the distribution of money at the beginning of the period. Therefor, it consists of
balances that are not spent plus the payments on nominal bonds:
∫
mdGa(m) =∫ θ
θ
pi1(z(θ))[1− b(L1(z(θ)))]L1(z(θ))
γ
dF (θ)
+
∫ θ
θ
pi2(z(θ))[1− b(L2(z(θ)))]L2(z(θ))
γ
dF (θ) +
∫
a−1
γ
dH(a−1) +
∫
h−1
γ
dJh−1
Plug in the labor market clearing condition:
sA
wM ′
+
γ − 1
wγ
− A−1
wγM
=∫ θ
θ
sγa(θ)dF (θ) + (1− 1
γ
)
∫ θ
θ
pi1(z(θ))(1− b(L1(z(θ))))L1(z(θ))dF (θ)
+(1− 1
γ
)
∫ θ
θ
pi2(z(θ))(1− b(L2(z(θ))))L2(z(θ))dF (θ)−
∫ θ
θ
a−1(1 +
1
γ
)dH(a−1)−
∫
h−1
γ
dJh−1
The labor-market-clearing can be written as:
1
wγ
[γ − 1− λ+ sλ] =
(2− sγ)
∫ θ
θ
a(θ)dF (θ) + (1− 1
γ
)
∫ θ
θ
pi1(z(θ))(1− b(L1(z(θ))))L1(z(θ))dF (θ)
+(1− 1
γ
)
∫ θ
θ
pi2(z(θ))(1− b(L2(z(θ))))L2(z(θ))dF (θ)−
∫
h(θ)
γ
dF (θ) (46)
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B Welfare Analysis
I use the household’s utility function to calculate welfare:
$ =
∫ ∫ ∫
{U(y) + u(q)− θl}dF (θ)dG(m)dH(a−1)
=
∫
U(y(θ))dF (θ) +
∫
u(q(z(θ)))dF (θ)−
∫ ∫ ∫
{θl}dF (θ)dG(m)dH(a−1)
I can write the last integral as:∫ ∫ ∫
(θl)dF (θ)dG(m)dH(a−1) =∫
[θ(y(θ) + z(θ) + h(θ) + sγa(θ))] dF (θ)
−
∫
θ
(∫
mdGa
)
dF (θ)−
∫
θ
(∫
a−1dH(a−1)
)
dF (θ)− T
∫
θdF (θ)
I have shown in the market clearing appendix the distribution of money before the lot-
teries is:∫
mdGa(m) =∫ θ
θ
pi1(z(θ))[1− b(L1(z(θ)))]L1(z(θ))
γ
dF (θ)
+
∫ θ
θ
pi2(z(θ))[1− b(L2(z(θ)))]L2(z(θ))
γ
dF (θ) +
∫
a−1
γ
dH(a−1) +
∫
h−1
γ
dJh−1
I can substitute for the distribution of money (mdGa) and labor supply (l) from the
above equations, and for government transfers (T ) from the the market clearing appendix
to simplify the equation for welfare:
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$ =
∫
[U(y(θ))− θy(θ) + u(q(z(θ)))− θz(θ)− θh(θ)− sγθa(θ)]dF (θ)
+
[∫ θ
θ
pi1(z(θ))[1− b(L1(z(θ)))]L1(z(θ))
γ
dF (θ)
]∫
θdF (θ)
+
[∫ θ
θ
pi2(z(θ))[1− b(L2(z(θ)))]L2(z(θ))
γ
dF (θ)
]∫
θdF (θ)
+(1 +
1
γ
)
[∫
a−1dHa−1
] ∫
θdF (θ) +
1
γ
[∫
h−1dJh−1
] ∫
θdF (θ)
+
1
wγ
[γ − 1− λ+ sλ]
∫
θdF (θ)
C Proof of theorem 2
Lets assume there are two types of agents in the economy, traders in the asset market
(denoted by subscript T) and non-traders (denoted by subscript N).
Value function of a trader:
WT (mT , a−1, θ) = max
yT ,lT ,zT ,a
U(yT )− θlT + VT (zT , hT , a)
st. pyT + zT + sγa ≤ mT + a−1 + lT + T
Value function of a non-trader:
WN(mN , θ) = max
yN ,lN ,zN
U(yN)− θlN + VN(zN , hN)
st. pyN + zN ≤ mN + lN + T
Using the budget constraint to eliminate li=N,T :
WT (mT , a−1, θ) = θ(mT+T+a−1)+max
yT≥0
{U(yT )− θpyT}+ max
zT ,a,hT
{−θ(zT + sγa+ hT ) + VT (zT , hT , a)}
WN(mN , θ) = θ(mN + T ) + max
yN≥0
{U(yN)− θpyN}+ max
zN ,hN
{−θ(zN + hN) + VN(zN , hN)}
The optimal choices of yi∈{T,N}, zi∈{T,N} and a must satisfy:
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U ′(yT ) = U ′(yN) = θ (47)
The above expression shows that a trader and a non-trader choose the same amount of
consumption in the frictionless market:
yT (θ) = yN(θ) = y(θ)
∂VT (zT , hT , a)
∂zT
{
≤ θ zT ≥ 0
≥ θ zT ≤ m− sγa− hT
(48)
∂VT (zT , hT , a)
∂hT
{
≤ θ hT ≥ 0
≥ θ hT ≤ m− sγa− zT
(49)
∂VT (zT , hT , a)
∂a
{
≤ θsγ a ≥ 0
≥ θsγ sa ≤ m− zT − hT
(50)
∂VN(zN , hN)
∂zN
{
≤ θ zN ≥ 0
≥ θ zN ≤ m− hN
(51)
∂VN(zN , hN)
∂hN
{
≤ θ hN ≥ 0
≥ θ hN ≤ m− zN
(52)
The value functions can be written as:
WT (mT , a−1, θ) = WT (0, 0, θ) + θmT + θa−1 (53)
Where:
WT (0, 0, θ) = U(y(θ))− θy(θ) + VT (zT (θ), hT (θ), a(θ))− θ(zT (θ) + hT (θ) + sγa(θ)) (54)
WN(mT , θ) = WT (0, θ) + θmN (55)
Where:
WN(0, θ) = U(y(θ))− θy(θ) + VN(zN(θ), hN(θ))− θ(zN(θ) + hN(θ)) (56)
We can see that the value function W () is linear in household’s asset holdings for both
traders and non-traders. Agents problem in the frictional market for traders and non-traders
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are similar. The difference comes from their value function which has 3 state variables for
traders and 2 state variables for non-traders. After simplification and applying the lotteries
as the previous section I can write agents value function as:
VT (zT , hT , a) = V˜T (z) + βE
[
WT (
zT + hT
γ
, a, θ)
]
= V˜T (zT ) + βE [WT (0, 0, θ)] +
βE(θ)zT
γ
+
βE(θ)hT
γ
+ βE(θ)a (57)
VN(zN , hN) = V˜N(z) + βE
[
WN(
zN + hN
γ
, θ)
]
= V˜N(zN) + βE [WN(0, θ)] +
βE(θ)zN
γ
+
βE(θ)hN
γ
(58)
Trader’s and non-trader’s choice of bond holding follows the following condition with
complementary slackness:{
a(θ) ≥ 0 θ ≥ βE(θ)
sγ
a(θ) ≤ mT − zT (θ)− hT (θ) θ ≤ βE(θ)sγ
(59)
{
hT (θ) ≥ 0 θ ≥ βE(θ)γ
hT (θ) ≤ mT − zT (θ)− a′(θ) θ ≤ βE(θ)γ
(60)
{
hN(θ) ≥ 0 θ ≥ βE(θ)γ
hN(θ) ≤ mN − zN(θ) θ ≤ βE(θ)γ
(61)
The labor choices of traders are the same as the labor choices in equations 28 and 27.
Labor choices of non-traders are as 62:
lN(m, θ) =

py(θ) + zN(θ)−mN − TN θ > βE(θ)sγ
py(θ) + zN(θ)−mN − TN θ = βE(θ)sγ
py(θ) +m−mN − TN θ < βE(θ)sγ
(62)
C.1 Market clearing condition and welfare measure
Similar to the case where all of the agents trade in the asset market the real transfer is:
T =
γ − 1
wγ
+
sA− A−1
wM ′
(63)
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The market clearing condition for the bond market and the general good market is the
same as 29 and 40.
Similar to the case with only one type of agent, the labor demand can be written as:
LD =
∫ θ
θ
y(θ)dF (θ) +
∫ θ
θ
pi1(zT (θ))b (L1(zT (θ)))L1(zT (θ))dFT (θ)
+
∫ θ
θ
pi1(zN(θ))b (L1(zN(θ)))L1(zN(θ))dFN(θ)
+
∫ θ
θ
pi2(zT (θ))b (L2(zT (θ)))L2(zT (θ))dFT (θ)
+
∫ θ
θ
pi2(zN(θ))b (L2(zN(θ)))L2(zN(θ))dFN(θ) (64)
Labor supply is the sum of households labor supply:
LS =
∫ θ
θ
∫ ∫
lT (mT , a, θ)dFT (θ)dGa(m)dH(a−1) +
∫ θ
θ
∫
lN(mN , θ)dFN(θ)dGa(m)
Substituting for labor choices and transfers:
Ls =
∫ θ
θ
∫ ∫
[py(θ) + zT (θ) + sγa(θ)−mT − a−1] dFT (θ)dGa(mT )dH(a−1)
+
∫ θ
θ
∫
[py(θ) + zN(θ)−mN ] dFN(θ)dGa(mN)
−γ − 1
wγ
− sA
wM ′
+
A−1
wγM
(65)
LS =
A−1
wγM
− sA
wM ′
− γ − 1
wγ
−
∫
mTdGa(mT )−−
∫
mNdGa(mN)−
∫
a−1dH(a−1)
+
∫ θ
θ
[y(θ) + zT (θ) + sγa(θ)]dFT (θ) +
∫ θ
θ
[y(θ) + zN(θ)]dFN(θ) (66)
Labor market clearing condition gives:
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A−1
wγM
− sA
wM ′
− γ − 1
wγ
−
∫
mTdGa(mT )−
∫
mNdGa(mN)
−
∫
a−1dH(a−1) +
∫ θ
θ
[zT (θ) + sa(θ)]dFT (θ) +
∫ θ
θ
[zN(θ)]dFN(θ)
=
∫ θ
θ
pi1(zT (θ))b (L1(zT (θ)))L1(zT (θ))dFT (θ) +
∫ θ
θ
pi1(zN(θ))b (L1(zN(θ)))L1(zN(θ))dFN(θ)
+
∫ θ
θ
pi2(zT (θ))b (L2(zT (θ)))L2(zT (θ))dFT (θ) +
∫ θ
θ
pi2(zN(θ))b (L2(zN(θ)))L2(zN(θ))dFN(θ)
Similar to the appendix A:
∫
mTdGa(mT ) =∫ θ
θ
pi1(zT (θ))[1− b(L1(zT (θ)))]L1(zT (θ))
γ
dFT (θ)
+
∫ θ
θ
pi2(zT (θ))[1− b(L2(zT (θ)))]L2(zT (θ))
γ
dFT (θ) +
∫
a−1
γ
dH(a−1) +
∫
h−1T
γ
dJh−1T
where dGa(mT ) is the traders’ distribution of money holdings at the beginning of the period.
Similarly, I can state the same for distribution of money holding among non-traders∫
mNdGa(mN) =∫ θ
θ
pi1(zN(θ))[1− b(L1(zN(θ)))]L1(zN(θ))
γ
dFN(θ)
+
∫ θ
θ
pi2(zN(θ))[1− b(L2(zN(θ)))]L2(zN(θ))
γ
dFN(θ) +
∫
h−1N
γ
dJh−1N
Plug in the labor market clearing condition:
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1wγ
[γ − 1− λ+ sλ] =
(2− sγ)
∫ θ
θ
a(θ)dFT (θ) + (1− 1
γ
)
∫ θ
θ
pi1(zT (θ))(1− b(L1(zT (θ))))L1(zT (θ))dFT (θ)
+(1− 1
γ
)
∫ θ
θ
pi2(zT (θ))(1− b(L2(zT (θ))))L2(zT (θ))dFT (θ)−
∫
hT (θ)
γ
dFT (θ)
+(1− 1
γ
)
∫ θ
θ
pi1(zN(θ))(1− b(L1(zN(θ))))L1(zN(θ))dFN(θ)−
∫
hN(θ)
γ
dFN(θ)
+(1− 1
γ
)
∫ θ
θ
pi2(zN(θ))(1− b(L2(zN(θ))))L2(zN(θ))dFN(θ)
It can be shown as in appendix for the benchmark model that the measure of welfare is:
$ =
∫
[U(y(θ))− θy(θ)− u(q(zT (θ)))− θzT (θ)− sγθa(θ)]dFT (θ)
+
[∫ θ
θ
pi1(zT (θ))[1− b(L1(zT (θ)))]L1(zT (θ))
γ
dFT (θ)
]∫
θdFT (θ)
+
[∫ θ
θ
pi2(zT (θ))[1− b(L2(zT (θ)))]L2(zT (θ))
γ
dFT (θ)
]∫
θdFT (θ)
+(1 +
1
γ
)
[∫
a−1dHa−1
] ∫
θdFT (θ) +
1
γ
[∫
h−1TdJh−1T
] ∫
θdFT (θ)
− 1
wγ
[γ − 1− λ+ sλ]
∫
θdFT (θ)
+
∫
[U(y(θ))− θy(θ) + u(q(zN(θ)))− θzN(θ)]dFN(θ)
+
[∫ θ
θ
pi1(zN(θ))[1− b(L1(zN(θ)))]L1(zN(θ))
γ
dFN(θ)
]∫
θdFN(θ)
+
[∫ θ
θ
pi2(zN(θ))[1− b(L2(zN(θ)))]L2(zN(θ))
γ
dFN(θ)
]∫
θdFN(θ)
+
1
γ
[∫
h−1NdJh−1N
] ∫
θdFN(θ) +
1
wγ
[γ − 1− λ+ sλ]
∫
θdFN(θ)
As I have shown above, the problem of traders and non-traders in the bond market are
very similar to the case with no exogenous segmentation in the asset market. The same
logic from the case with endogenous asset market segmentation applies and asset market
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traders and non-traders solve optimization problems similar to the problem in the previous
sections. The households’ decisions are only linked through the market clearing conditions
and prices. We have a partial block recursive equilibrium in which the distributions in the
economy affects households’ decision through prices. Households do not take in to account
the distribution of asset holdings among traders and non-traders. The main results in the
previous sections are robust to adding exogenously segmented asset market.
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